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17 Economy, Frontiers, and the Silk Road
in Western Historiographies of Graeco-
Roman Antiquity
I The Mediterranean and Trans-imperial Exchange
Although the last few years have seen a surge of publications on Indo-Roman trade
and Silk Road exchange,1 the trans-imperial trade connections of the Hellenistic
and Roman Empires have never been central to the field of Graeco-Roman history.
The Greeks and Romans were Mediterranean societies. Their involvement in Asia
beyond Asia Minor was the result of colonization, annexation, and conquest, but
not central to their cultural formation, empire building, and economy.2 The Mediter-
ranean perspective of studies on Greek and Roman culture, that explains itself by
the origin of Graeco-Roman history in Greek and Latin philology, gained further
momentum by a new interest in Mediterranean connectivity that developed in the
wake of the English translation of Fernand Braudel’s La Méditerranée et le monde
méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (1949) in 1972. Since then, Graeco-Roman
culture and economy could be even more convincingly, and more comprehensively,
located in the Mediterranean Basin.3 The subject of ancient history was no longer
defined just by the languages, but instead by geographical, cultural, and economic
cohesion of the ancient Mediterranean. In 2000, Horden and Purcell published a
volume full of knowledge and insight about ecologies, microclimates, nutrition, set-
tlement patterns, and systems of travel and exchange that gave life to the Mediter-
ranean as a connected human landscape. In an often-quoted phrase, they sum-
marized the Mediterranean’s most important characteristics as fragmentation and
connectivity: “We have identified extreme topographical fragmentation as one of
two environment ingredients – along with the connectivity provided by the sea it-
self – in a distinctly Mediterranean history.”4
The unity of the Mediterranean is a construct, but it has some natural basis:
The region was the home of particular vines, the European olive, and certain types
of wheat typically consumed by Greeks and Romans; it was a unified climatic zone
and it was relatively easily navigable. The very uneven distribution of natural re-
 Matthew 2015; de Romanis and Maiuro 2015; McLaughlin 2016; Evers 2017; Wilson and Bowman
2018 (part III); Cobb 2018; 2019.
 See, however, Fitzpatrick 2011 with a different emphasis. For the Mediterranean orientation of
the Hellenistic Empires, see von Reden, ch. 1, this volume.
 See, however, Burkert (1984) 1992; Morris and Manning 2005, 17 for further dissenting voices.
 Horden and Purcell 2000, 175.
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sources, especially metals, and its diverse microclimatology encouraged a system
of Mediterranean-wide trade.5 Yet the Mediterranean is also a political instrument.
In an important colloquium four years after the publication of Corrupting Sea, Herz-
feld called the Mediterranean a civilizational ideal, a “strategy of self-stereotyping,”
and part of the “politics of humiliation” in a global national hierarchy.6 Bagnall in
the same colloquium emphasized the ambivalent place of Graeco-Roman Egypt in
this socio-geographical scheme. Despite Egypt’s extended Mediterranean coast, he
argued, it never fully belonged to the category of a Mediterranean society, nor
Graeco-Roman Egypt to the realm of ancient history proper.7
Greeks and Romans themselves anchored their cultural belonging in the Medi-
terranean Sea. Contacts and exchange between Asia and Egypt had been intense
from the times of the Bronze Age onward – not least mediated by Greek settlement
on the Ionian and Levantine coasts, the Egyptian delta, and Cyprus.8 But it was in
the aftermath of the Persian Wars that a strong sense developed (forced to empha-
size unity) that Greeks lived as free citizens in city-states in a manner that came to
be seen as typical of Greece and the Aegean Sea, while Persians were by nature
subjects.9 In this self-imagination, barbarians neither participated in, nor were af-
fected by, the more advanced culture of poleis. Geographical and medical writers
placed Greek civilization in the world’s temperate central zones, while people either
more savage or softer, but in any case less civilized, inhabited the climatically more
extreme regions toward the edges of the world.10 As the Macedonians conquered
Asia and Egypt, kings and immigrants were drawn to the Mediterranean coast lines:
Alexandria in Egypt was founded on the Mediterranean, and soon replaced Mem-
phis as the royal capital; the Seleukids shifted their political core from the Persis to
Babylonia and connected it via roads and colonial foundations to the newly built
capitals Antiocheia and Seleukeia on the Syrian coast.11 Even long after the expan-
sion of the Roman Empire, Rome never ceased to be the uncontested center of the
Roman Empire. It was not only the seat of the emperor, but also the center of the
orbis terrarum that could be grasped conceptually and geographically only from
a central and elevated vantage point.12 A monument called the Golden Milestone
(milliarium aureum) erected by Augustus in 20  in the center of the city symbol-
ized Rome’s central position in its world: all roads led here.
 Harris 2005, 5‒6.
 Herzfeld 2005, 48, 52, 59; also Morris and Manning 2005, 19–22 for the politics of the Mediterrane-
an paradigm.
 Bagnall 2005.
 Most recently Broodbank 2013 on these connections and their role in the formation of Mediterra-
nean unity.
 Cartledge 1993, 36–63.
 See von Reden, ch. 8 B, this volume.
 See von Reden, ch. 1, this volume.
 Murphy 2004, 129–164.
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Economic history and theory furthered Mediterranean unity. In a famous pas-
sage introducing his influential The Ancient Economy (1973), Moses Finley defended
a unitary perspective on the Graeco-Roman economy with reference to its difference
from those of the ancient Near East, the Babylonians, Phoenicians, Egyptians and
Persians:
The Near Eastern economies were dominated by large palace or temple complexes, who owned
the greater part of the arable virtually monopolized anything that can be called ‘industrial
production’ as well as foreign trade … and organized the economic, military, political and
religious life of the society through a single complicated, bureaucratic, record-keeping opera-
tion for which the word ‘rationing,’ taken very broadly, is a good one-word description. None
of this is relevant to the Greco-Roman world until the conquests of Alexander the Great and
later the Romans incorporated large Near Eastern territories. At that point we shall have to
look more closely at this Near Eastern kind of society.13
He left the issue at that point, since, as he argued, if he were to define ‘ancient’ to
embrace both worlds, there was not a single topic that could be discussed “without
resorting to disconnected sections, employing different concepts and models.” Fin-
ley conceded that there were forms of private landownership and labor also in the
Near East, and there were also independent craftsmen and traders in the towns.
Yet it was not possible to elevate these people to driving forces in the economic
development of the Near East, whereas the Graeco-Roman economy was essentially
one of private property.14
While Finley did not discuss the factors that changed the Near Eastern and
Egyptian economies after the Macedonian conquest, the editors of the more recent
Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (CEHGRW) emphasized the
justification of Graeco-Roman unity in a broader sense. The division between east
and west in antiquity was overstated, but there were very real differences between
“most of the economic systems of Egypt and the Near East, in which temples, pal-
aces and redistributive bureaucracies performed crucial functions, and those of the
Greeks and Roman societies, where they generally did not”.15 However, the category
of Graeco-Roman economy was dislocated from its Mediterranean home, insofar as
Greek and Roman institutions and practices were exported to other regions.16 Both
before the Classical period (479–336 ) but especially after it, there were many
connections and interpenetrations of these essentially different systems. Accounts
of the pre-Hellenistic Near East, Seleukid Asia, Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt as well
as the Roman frontier zones were naturally included in the CEHGRW. They demon-
strated the gradual transformation, continuity, and change under Graeco-Roman
presence. No uniform picture emerged from these regional views. However, and
 Finley (1973) 1985, 28.
 See Baker and Jursa 2014; Jursa 2014.
 Morris, Saller, and Scheidel. 2007, 8.
 Bingen (1978) 2007.
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simplification permitted, the conclusion of most chapters was that the impact of
Graeco-Roman institutions, private property rights, monetization, technological
knowledge, and the logistics of transport and trade led to an increase in market
exchange and economic performance.17 Some authors were hesitant to attribute in-
creased performance just to Graeco-Roman institutional change: Monetization and
monetary tribute of the Near East began in the age of Dareios; experimentation with
new, more marketable agrarian produce built on pre-Hellenistic trends in Egypt;
and army presence in Roman frontier zones had very different kinds of impact in
different provinces.18 Yet it was Graeco-Roman presence and their institutions and
forms of knowledge that led to new economic practices and levels of performance.
In a thought-provoking study, suggestively entitled The Roman Bazaar (2008),
Bang criticized this approach to the Graeco-Roman economy. Its overly Western out-
look, which centralized markets, private property, and individuals as driving forces
of economic development, in fact projected dynamics that had in fact emerged
much later in the context of the European nation state into the imperial world of
antiquity. The economic development of tributary empires had a different logic. To
ignore this put one in danger of reinforcing European orientalism, which belittled
the prosperity of Asian empires before European colonialism.19 The market model,
characterized by monetary exchange, private property rights, and rational choice,
was deeply impregnated by the universalist claims of classical political economy
that developed in Early Modern Europe. Competition between independent nation-
states and governments, international opportunities for competitive investment of
commercial capital, and mercantilist politics were typical for this historically unique
state system. The Roman Empire, in contrast, was not part of a competitive state
system, nor were its provinces autonomous states. It resembled rather more the
early modern tributary empires of Asia, the Ottomans, the Mughals, or China of the
Ming and Ch’ing dynasty. Inter-state competition was a much weaker dynamic in
these, and also in the Roman Empire. “The Roman state was already the most pow-
erful and had much less in need to privilege commercial groups; it could concen-
trate on taxing its vast population, particularly the peasant masses.”20
The authors of the Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World ap-
proached the ancient economy from its centers. The main subjects of inquiry were
the city-states of Greece and Italy where the development of free peasantries, private
property rights, and monetization had played an undeniably positive role for eco-
nomic performance before the Hellenistic period. The impact of the imperial expan-
sion of the Greek world from the late fourth century , and of the Roman world
from the late third century , continued to be viewed (as in Graeco-Roman history
 Shown more thoroughly for Roman Egypt by Monson 2012.
 Van der Spek 2007; Manning 2007; Cherry 2007.
 Bang 2008; Morris 2010 for a long-term analysis.
 Bang 2008, 12.
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more generally) from the perspective of the old and new Greek and Roman centers.
The Hellenistic capitals and later the city of Rome profitted from the economic de-
velopment of the conquered land, and in turn these regions developped under the
influence of the Greeks and Romans. Contacts beyond the Graeco-Roman Empires,
moreover, played a relatively subordinate role. In a chapter discussing the Seleukid
economy of the third to first centuries , van der Spek, for example, raised the
question of whether trade with Central Asia increased in the Seleukid Near East,
but found no positive evidence.21 Rathbone, writing on Roman Egypt (first to third
centuries ), was well acquainted with the spectacular value of trade between
Egypt and India in the first century . Nevertheless, he saw the impact of this
trade to be limited to a small elite of financiers in Italy and Alexandria, and the
manufacturing industries in Alexandria and Koptos where the import of perfumes,
textiles and spices generated processing industries.22 Imports from Arabia and In-
dia, and their visible traces in Palmyra and the ports of the Red Sea coast, receive
due attention in Morley’s and Alcock’s accounts of trade in the Roman Empire and
the Eastern Mediterranean respectively. But once again, they are described as sepa-
rate phenomena. Although profoundly affecting Palmyra as a nodal city on the
routes to the Gulf and further on, Roman imports served the consumption and fi-
nancial interests of just a small Italian and Roman elite.23 Lo Cascio emphasized the
low state rate of the Roman fiscal economy, while not discussing the potentially
huge fiscal income from external trade and frontier zone development.24 In the dom-
inant models of the Graeco-Roman economy, trade and exchange with India, Central
Asia and further east were no more than comparable to the modern drug trade:
highly profitable for some, and stimulating complex exchange networks, but with
little impact on economy and society as a whole. The focus on the economic princi-
ples of the imperial cores, and the resultant lack of integrating peripheral zones
into research on the economies of the Hellenistic and Roman Empires, made it diffi-
cult to even raise the question of their impact.
For a long time, research on long-distance trade with India, the Arabian Penin-
sula, Central Asia and beyond was the concern of academic subgroups, particularly
archaeologists and papyrologists whose interest in Egypt, Arabia, and India led
them to transcend mainstream ancient history.25 In 1954, Mortimer Wheeler pub-
lished what then was regarded an authoritative study of Roman trade beyond its
frontiers.26 Wheeler had been Director General of the Archaeological Survey of India
 Van der Spek 2007, 423.
 Rathbone 2007, 711.
 Morley 2007a, 583–584; Alcock 2007, 689–690, both marking it as an aside of Roman trade.
 Lo Cascio 2007; Bowman and Wilson 2018 for a different assessment of the fiscal income derived
from cross-border trade.
 Pioniering studies were Rawlinson 1916, Charlesworth 1924, and Warmington 1928, but their
interest in trade was limited; see Evers 2017, 4.
 Wheeler 1954.
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between 1944 and 1948, and after partition functioned as archaeological advisor to
the newly formed government in Pakistan. In his Presidential Address to the Oxford
meeting of the British Association in September 1954 entitled “Colonial Archaeolo-
gy,” he stressed that the theme of his lecture related to the safeguarding of cultural,
historical, and archaeological heritage in Britain’s colonial territories.27 More than
20 years later, Raschke, an ancient historian and Harvard-trained economist, was
commissioned to write a chapter for the multivolume Aufstieg und Niedergang der
römsichen Welt (1978). Raschke was eager to emphasize that there was no coordinat-
ed trade between Rome and the East. The silk trade was indirect, a series of uncoor-
dinated exchanges starting with the Chinese tribute payments to the Xiongnu via
enterprising merchants in Central Asia who sold their goods to Parthians and Indi-
ans until they reached the Roman borders in Syria and Egypt.28 This view that East-
ern trade reached Rome at the end of a series of disconnected enterprises embedded
in local exchange systems and consumption centers was adopted again 20 years
later by Young. Archaeological projects in the Eastern Desert, the Red Sea ports
and sites along the coast of the Arabian Peninsula have stimulated debate over the
conditions of Indo-Roman trade, its development and decline, and the communities
and people both involved in and driving it.29 Yet the crucial question of precisely
how external contacts and exchanges affected local, and possibly also wider, sys-
tems of trade and exchange was not answered in any systematic or analytical way.
Textual and archaeological research in combination suggest a complicated assem-
blage of local and long-distance exchange networks peopled by different communi-
ties and economic agents from all regions involved.30
The idea of a ‘Silk Road’ was adopted by the geographer and geologist Ferdi-
nand von Richthofen (1833–1904) and came to symbolize the vitality of trans-Eura-
sian trade long before the modern period.31 Yet, both the term and the idea behind
it have been met with much skepticism among ancient historians. Its romantic allu-
sion to camel trains and caravan cities has popular appeal, but little analytical pow-
er. Its underlying assumptions of traders linking supply and demand at either end
of the long route is certainly mistaken, as Raschke, Young, and many others have
shown.32 Most scholars have toned down the term by referring to a number of ‘silk
routes’ in inverted commas and including into this category multiple pathways on
the way as well as maritime trade routes between India and Egypt where silk played
a subordinate role. Some scholars insist that, in contrast to the maritime trade
routes, evidence for overland movement of goods from China through Central Asia
 Ray 2008, 1; Tomber 2008, 13–14.
 Raschke 1978, e.g., 605.
 Proceedings of the Red Sea Project I–V; Tomber 2008; Sidebotham 2011; Sidebotham and Gates-
Foster 2019; Cuvigny 2003.
 Tomber 2008; Thomas 2009; Sidebotham 2011; Evers 2017.
 Galli 2017, 4; Brown 2018, 98–99; and von Richthofen 1877–1912.
 Wiesehöfer, ch. 11, this volume; Graf 2018; Cobb 2018.
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and Mesopotamia before Late Antiquity (ca. 400–ca. 650 ) was scant, fragmenta-
ry, incoherent, and did not add up to a continuous well-frequented route from China
to the Mediterranean coast.33
Both as a consequence of growing interests in global contexts and fruitful con-
troversies over the Mediterranean character of the Graeco-Roman economy, the in-
sularity of research on trans-imperial exchange is gradually dissolving. Thus, Evers
asked in his 2017 publication:
What if the Mediterranean is better perceived of, at least for the purpose of some studies, not
as a unit, but as part of a greater whole, such as the Eurasian landmass, or, as in this study,
the periphery of the Indian Ocean? In this case, we need to think about the historiographical
consequences of shifting Rome from being the center, to being a center in the peripheral west
of Eurasia, which is really just a late consequence of old and new discussions about the impli-
cations of postcolonialism and globalization for our interpretation of the Roman Empire …
[T]he old ways of writing about Indo-Roman trade die hard, infusing studies with a ‘Romano-
centric’ bias as regards the sources singled out for analysis, in turn emphasizing Roman carri-
ers of the trade and a Roman chronology for trade in the Indian Ocean.34
Less globally oriented, but equally forceful, Bowman and Wilson in their latest vol-
ume of the Oxford Roman Economy Project (OxRep) have called for a better integra-
tion of external trade into the Roman trade system:
It is our contention, in fact, that external trade, with the east whether via Palmyra and the Silk
Road(s) or with the Arabian peninsula and India, and with (and even across) the Sahara,
should be considered not merely as an exotic sideshow, but as a fundamental part of the
Roman trade system from the reign of Augustus onward, important not only for the quantities
of exotic imports that it introduced, but also for the fiscal revenue that the 25 per cent customs
dues yielded.35
The two statements address very different problems. Evers asks us to rethink the
position of the Roman Empire in a global post-imperial world, in which the Romans
no longer were the central players. He questions the role of Rome as the initiator of
global interaction, its rhythms and directions, as well as the autonomy of the Ro-
man Empire in a multi-imperial orbit. He also qualifies, if not yet explicitly, the
centrality of the city of Rome in a ‘hublike’ imperial structure within which the
center dominated its peripheral regions to channel resources to the core.36 Address-
ing the social and economic organization of Indo-Roman trade in which more than
 Millar 1998; Sartre 2000; Ball 2000; disputed by McLaughlin 2014; 2016, and Graf 2018; for the
latest assessment, Gregoratti 2019.
 Evers 2017, 4 and 5; also Fitzpatrick 2011, and Ball 2007.
 Bowman and Wilson 2018, 13; Wilson 2015.
 Motyl 2001 for this model of imperial structure; Scheidel 2012, 27–28 for discussion. According
to Hopkins 1995–1996, Morley 2007a, and Morris, Saller, and Scheidel 2007, the city of Rome as a
consumption center was the single most important factor driving economic performance, trade and
market development in the Roman Empire.
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one empire or polity was involved, Evers draws our attention to the multifaceted
assemblage of regions, communities and frontier regions that were involved. These
were not just middlemen and transit zones in Indo-Roman trade, but active partici-
pants in the construction of the system. Bowman and Wilson, by contrast, do not
question the dominating role of the Roman Empire and the centrality of Rome in
Indo-Roman trade. They emphasize the fiscal and financial interest the Roman state
took in the income derived from this trade. But they urge us better to integrate
external trade into our understanding of the ancient economy. They invite us to
think more carefully about the role external trade played in the state budget, and
in the complex connection between tax income, coin supply, and military expendi-
ture.37
The two issues, though related, lead into different and unconnected traditions
of ancient historical research. The one concerns the nature of the ancient economy,
the other relates to the political construction of the Roman Empire and its relation
to its frontiers. Both contribute to the issues at stake. In order to answer the ques-
tions raised in this handbook, we will need to bridge these two fields of study: What
were the dynamics of the ancient economy, which sources of income were generat-
ed, and how did ancient governments engage in the development of the economy?
To what extent did the Roman interest in its border zones extend beyond preparing
for warfare, defending possessions, supplying troops and exploiting resources? How
were economic frontiers integrated into the Roman Empire and its economy? Did
the Roman state identify economic interests in connection with its frontiers, and
which measures did it take to pursue and defend such interests?
Studies of both the ancient economy and of the Roman frontiers have generated
an enormous amount of scholarship, of a highly detailed as well as conceptual kind,
which can only be discussed in their broadest outlines here. Yet, although they are
in many respects closely related, the traditions of research have little overlap.38 To
a significant extent this was a consequence of very diverse historiographic develop-
ments, as these themes were pursued by two distinct groups of specialists without
much direct scholarly exchange.
Sitta von Reden
II Trends in the Historiography of the Graeco-Roman Economy
II. The Ancient Economy and European Modernity
Ancient economic history developed as a subject of academic research in connec-
tion with the emergence of European capitalism and the field of classical political
 Bowman and Wilson 2018, 14.
 Cf. e.g., Young 2001; Sidebotham 2011; Speidel 2016.
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economy within philosophical inquiry in the late eighteenth century. It was pio-
neered by the groundbreaking study Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener (1817) of the
Berlin classical philologist August Boeckh, which was rapidly translated into En-
glish as The Public Economy of Athens (1827). Boeckh compiled all available literary
and epigraphic data about prices, wages, interest rates, public income, and expend-
iture, and framed them with discussions of demography, agriculture, manufacture,
commerce, money and credit, mining, slavery, nutrition, clothing, and total costs of
living in Athens. He thereby defined a subject area for ancient economic history
that was strongly influenced by the national economies emerging in Western Europe
at the time and the theoretical reflection about them in Scottish moral philosophy.39
Well into the eighteenth century, economic theory had been shaped by the classical
separation of agrarian household management (oikonomia) on the one hand, and
commerce (Gk chrematistike, lat. commercium), on the other.40 It was only in the
Scottish enlightenment, culminating in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) that there developed an integrated notion of
political economy. It connected these fields and constituted the relationship be-
tween consumption, agrarian as well as commercial production, and market distri-
bution as the joint foundations of national wealth. Smith, however, regarded his
economic model, and its underlying principle of the profit-seeking individual, as
typical not only for contemporary national economies, but as universally valid. This
universal claim gave the study of economic history a teleological direction toward
Western economic liberalism that has never vanished.41
However, the universalizing claims of economic theory immediately met with
critical response. The maximizing principle of human behavior in particular was
called into question. According to Adam Smith, individuals served the interests of
others not out of a sense of benevolence or charity, but out of self-interest and calcu-
lation.42 The term homo oeconomicus, which still stands for the maximizing princi-
ple today, was coined by John Stuart Mill as a critical objection against the notion
of the profit-seeking individual, as it so strongly contradicted the classical concept
of mankind as homo politicus. Accordingly, the market of the invisible hand that
Smith envisioned as not just a distribution mechanism but as the basic means of
political integration, was questioned. The German Historical School of National Eco-
nomics that developed around Wilhelm Roscher (1817–1894) responded to the uni-
versalistic model of the Scottish enightenment scholars by relating the economy of
the present to a historical process of gradual emergence. In the subsequent genera-
tion of scholars around Gustav Schmoller (1847–1930), economic theories were de-
 Schneider 1988.
 Burkhardt, Oexle, and Spahn 1992.
 Bang 2008; Morley 2009, 21–46.
 Smith (1776) 1961, 26–27.
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veloped on the basis of empirical historical investigations, from which the precondi-
tions of modern capitalism were derived.
Classical economics was developed further by the Neoclassical School. Influen-
tial economists such as Léon Walras (1834–1910) in France, Carl Menger (1840–1921)
in Germany and Alfred Marshal (1842–1924) in Britain theorized the market as a
price formation mechanism based on supply and demand (equilibrium).43 Constitut-
ing equilibrium as the principle goal of markets, and markets the center of economic
analysis, they transformed economics into a science based on quantifiable data and
mathematical models. The maximizing principle was developed further into the
concept of rational choice according to which economic agents always strive to
make decisions to their best advantage, and thus make choice available for margin-
al cost calculation. To this day, neoclassical economic theory forms the basis of
mainstream economics. For the investigation of precapitalist and non-Western
economies, however, there remain only two options. Either the principles of modern
economic theory are assumed to be generally valid, or they are regarded as the
outcome of modern capitalism and largely useless for understanding precapitalist
economies.
Since these controversies, the question of what constitutes economic history
has been central to Graeco-Roman economic historians. If economic history is de-
fined as the study of markets whose price formation processes are to be examined,44
it is very difficult to gather appropriate data. As we shall see below, ancient histori-
ans nevertheless have attempted to do so. At the other end of the spectrum are
anthropological and cultural approaches that have developed in opposition to the
neoclassical paradigm. They define an economy most broadly as the sum of activi-
ties that secure material livelihoods.45 Relationships, social values, and local mod-
els of meaning are at the center of such approaches and have led to historical re-
search that may be regarded as much as cultural as economic history.46 While
cultural approaches to the Graeco-Roman economy were en vogue during the 1990s,
and led to much collaboration between anthropologists, literary critics, and ancient
historians, in the last 20 years the pendulum has swung back to economic history
in the neoclassical sense.47 However, neoclassical approaches have become more
accommodating to historians of premodern economies in the course of the debates
over Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE). For NIE economists, rational choice, the
calculating individual, and market development are still essential to the analysis of
economic processes. However, the institutional (that is, normative and legal) con-
texts of markets and the normative conditions of rational choice are given greater
 Roll 1956.
 Roll 1956, 373.
 Polanyi 1977, 230.
 Carrier 2012, 4‒7.
 Morris 1994; Morris and Manning 2005.
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prominence.48 This has offered new opportunities for studying the variable institu-
tional influences on markets and behavior in historical perspective. Douglass North
(1920–2015), a Nobel Prize winning economist, was particularly influential in rede-
fining economic history as the task of identifying institutional and organizational
conditions that explain structure and performance of historical economies through
time.49 This approach had a major impact on research into ancient economic history
in the twenty-first century.
II. The Bücher-Meyer Controversy and the Ancient Economy
Given its close connection with the emergence of Western modernity, ancient eco-
nomic history has been concerned with its own theoretical assumptions more inten-
sively than any other branch of ancient history. Its role in shaping modern thought
and the role of Europe in the global cultural scheme came to the fore in the contro-
versy between the national economist of the Historical School Karl Bücher (1847–
1937) and the ancient historian Eduard Meyer (1855–1930).50 Bücher developed a
model of European history that established a development of stages from the
“closed domestic economy” of antiquity via the “city economy” of the Middle Ages
to the “national economy” of modern times.51 With this model he met sharp criti-
cism from Meyer, who defended the modernity of the ancient economy in the neo-
classical sense. In his response to Bücher, Meyer sketched a picture of the gradual
development of the Greek economy from the eighth century  onward toward a
capitalist market economy. Trade, commerce, money, and market-oriented produc-
tion drove a dynamic economy in classical Athens that reached its climax with
banks and high volumes of credit in the fifth and fourth centuries .52 The land-
owning aristocracy was replaced by an aspiring industrial bourgeoisie by the late
fifth century. In his five-volume Geschichte des Altertums (1884–1902) Meyer com-
pared the seventh to fifth centuries  in Greece to the fourteenth to sixteenth
centuries  in Europe. His colleague Julius Beloch largely adopted this model in
his three volumes of Griechische Geschichte (1893–1904).
The dispute between Bücher and Meyer, introduced into ancient history by
Moses Finley as the ‘primitivist-modernist debate,’ was highly influential for re-
search on the ancient economy up to the early 1990s.53 In fact, Bücher and Meyer
were concerned with more than the question of whether the ancient economy was
primitive or modern. Meyer placed trade and markets at the center of ancient eco-
 North 1990; Frier and Kehoe 2007; Bresson (2007–2008) 2016.
 North 1981, 3.
 Finley 1979 for a collection of key texts in English translation.
 Bücher 1893.
 For a rival of ancient capitalism, Bresson 2014; critically Bang 2008, 45.
 Andreau (1995) 2001; Cartledge 1998; Nafissi 2005.
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nomic performance in the sense of the classical and neoclassical economy; Bücher,
on the other hand, understood the economy as a part of political and social commu-
nity-building in the agrarian household, the city, and the nation state.54 His concern
was about structures rather than economic performance.
The extent to which the controversy over the ancient economy was implicated
in contemporary debates over national economic performance and the welfare state
is shown by the work of the sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920).55 Engaging with
the methodological and historical conflicts of the Bücher-Meyer controversy in a
long handbook article Agrarverhältnisse des Altertums (translated into English
70 years later as Agrarian sociology of ancient civilizations), he constructed a three-
sector model with a natural economy in the rural sector, a surplus production sector
based on slave labor on large Roman estates, and a commercial sector in the cities.56
Important methodological change occurred between the second and third editions
of this article. Weber abandoned the historical approach to economic systems and
presented instead a theory of ideal types which was to have a great influence on
the social sciences of the twentieth century. The three-sector model gave way to a
more conceptual approach in which household economy, the slave mode of produc-
tion, and the economy of cities were just mental constructs (‘ideal types’) for heuris-
tic analytical purposes.57 Weber’s sociological study on the ancient world initially
had little influence on ancient history in Germany. Then, Johannes Hasebroek, a
student of Eduard Meyer’s, took up Weber’s and Bücher’s project and emphasized
the profound influence of state and city-state social structures on ancient econo-
mies. One of Hasebroek’s central ideas in his Staat und Handel im Alten Griechen-
land (1928) was that people without citizenship rights and landed property dominat-
ed trade and commerce. The outsider role of people involved in trade and commerce
marginalized economic matters in politics, and thus prevented the emergence of a
modern economy. Hasebroek’s interest once again was concerned with economic
structures rather than performance, and of emphasizing difference rather than simi-
larity between ancient and modern economic behavior.
Yet it was Fritz Heichelheim (1901–1968) and the Russian émigré Michail Rostov-
tzeff (1870–1952) who dominated Western ancient economic history until the 1960s.
They focused not so much on the Greek city-state, but rather on the development
of interconnected markets and trade in the Hellenistic and Roman Empires. Heichel-
heim argued that the expansion of Greek culture in the Hellenistic period after the
conquests of Alexander and the resulting demand for Greek luxury goods in Helle-
nistic royal courts and cities led to a massive increase in long-distance trade. This
stimulated the creation of an economic area integrated by supply and demand from
 Wagner-Hasel 2004.
 Nafissi 2005; Eich 2006; Bang 2008.
 Weber 1897.
 Weber 1904 on the concept of ideal types.
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the Western Mediterranean to the Near East.58 It was no coincidence that one year
after the Great Depression, Heichelheim published a study on economic cycles in
the Hellenistic world on the basis of variations in wages, prices, and interest rates
from Egypt, Delos, and Uruk.59 Less concerned with price data and economic scales,
Rostovtzeff envisioned the Hellenistic and Roman Empires as dynamically moving
toward a capitalist world economy.60 Against the background of his own experience
of the modernization process of late imperial Russia, and a magisterial knowledge
of ancient archaeological, epigraphical and papyrological evidence from Southern
Russia, Syria, Egypt, and the Mediterranean, he designed a grand panorama of the
Hellenistic and Roman economies driven by dynamic urban bourgeoisies, yet even-
tually held back by the primitiveness of the agrarian sector.61
II. Polanyi, Substantivism and Finley’s Ancient Economy
The work of the Austro-Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi (1886–1966), who had
emigrated in 1933 and lived in America from 1940, played a central role in anthropo-
logical discussions about alternative economic systems from the postwar period un-
til the 1990s and beyond.62 Shocked by the collapse of capitalism in the late 1920s,
he led an almost emotional campaign against the universal claims of liberal market
economics. Instead, he developed an anthropological vision of market-less, simple
or even socialist social formations prior to the triumphal advance of liberal markets.
In precapitalist societies, economic behavior had been ‘embedded’ in social and
political institutions. A self-interested homo oeconomicus that was free of social and
ethical concerns of justice and fair exchange was an invention of capitalist society,
as was an autonomous economic process that was socially “disembedded.”63
Strongly influenced by leading anthropologists like Richard Thurnwald, Bro-
nislaw Malinowski and Marcell Mauss, Polanyi developed an anthropological model
of economic development that was based on modes of exchange and forms of social
integration. These regulated the flow of goods in precapitalist societies: household
exchange, ‘reciprocity’ (interpersonal mutual exchange based on ideas of fairness
and justice), and state ‘redistribution.’64 Only in the course of the ‘Great Transfor-
mation’ during the early industrial age did market exchange develop into the fourth
principle of integration (see Adam Smith, above).65 Polanyi later abandoned house-
 Heichelheim 1938.
 Heichelheim 1930.
 Rostovtzeff 1939–1944; (1926) 1957.
 Rostovtzeff (1926) 1957, esp. 538.
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hold exchange as an early form of social and economic integration. His model of
economic development was also not a strictly evolutionary one. Thus there were
forms of reciprocity and redistribution in capitalist societies, and market ‘elements’
could also develop in precapitalist societies. Moreover, in an influential article on
the pseudo-Aristotelian Oikonomika, he argued that Aristotle had discovered politi-
cal economy as a field of theory and planning independently of society and poli-
tics.66 Essential for the character of an economy was, instead, the question of which
institutions were crucial for integrating a society or state. Moreover, market ele-
ments rarely if ever remained uncontrolled in preindustrial societies. He and his
colleagues observed a certain type of commercial harbor in many contemporary
African and historical societies, which he modelled into the concept of ‘port-of-
trade.’67 These ports housed one or more trading communities, hedged in and pro-
tected by official or state control both for their own preservation and for the social
protection of the local society. In contrast to the modern ‘formalist’ concept of the
economy defined by the profit motive and market principle, Polanyi postulated a
‘substantive’ economic concept. It was grounded in the necessity for humans to
provide a livelihood for themselves within a communal context, rather than doing
so with their own advantage in mind.
While Polanyi exerted little direct influence on ancient economic historians of
his time, his anti-modernist stance strongly resonated in Moses Finley’s The Ancient
Economy (1973), one of the most influential works of ancient history in the twentieth
century.68 Theoretically eclectic and not particularly novel in any of its detail, The
Ancient Economy designed an overall model of the ancient economy that combined
well-selected source material into a radically new approach to the ancient economy.
It was an attack both against the modernizing assumptions of earlier economic his-
torians, and against the positivistic method of data collection that characterized
their research. He also argued strongly against Marxist positions which had infiltrat-
ed economic history not only in Eastern Europe but also Western Germany, Italy,
France and Britain during the 1960s and early 1970s.69 In return, he offered a power-
ful framework for the analysis of the structural differences between the ancient and
modern economies. These included the predominance of the agrarian household
over market exchange; the importance of social status as against economic class; a
particular kind of hierarchical social relationships in which slave labor dominated
production; a particular relationship between town and countryside; and the priori-
ty of politics over economics, the latter being nonexistent as a separate discourse,
or unit of analysis, in ancient states.
 Polanyi 1957a.
 Polanyi 1963; cf.1957a.
 Finley had collaborated with Polanyi at Columbia University, but it came to an end with the
expulsion of Finley from Rutgers University, Nafissi 2005, 209–214.
 Nafissi 2005, 205–208 for Finley’s Marxist orientation during his early career.
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According to Finley, the ancient economy was a subsistence economy character-
ized by domestic self-sufficiency and the ideal of political autarky. The basis for all
wealth was agriculture. Due to the availability of slave labor, the productivity of
this agricultural domain never increased substantially, nor was it made more effi-
cient through significant technical development. There was no economic growth in
real terms. Within the economy as a whole, trade played only a minor role. Land
transport was expensive, while sea transport risky and, with a few exceptions, con-
centrated on the import of luxury goods for consumption by a small elite. Cities did
not specialize in any branch of production or manufacture that would have stimu-
lated the division of labor, markets, and trade. Cities, in contrast to their industrial-
ized counterparts, were political-religious centers of administration and represen-
tation, rather than centers of production. There were no rational individuals who
made cost-benefit calculations in order to effectively increase the productivity of
their land, or reinvested any profit in order to increase profitability through techno-
logical improvement or agricultural intensification. Wealth and surplus were invest-
ed into conspicuous consumption for the purpose of maintaining status and power.
Loans were also used for consumption purposes only, to finance monetary dowries,
or to compensate for temporary liquidity problems. Money was not capital but coin-
age, the minting of which was aimed at the self-representation of poleis and not at
facilitating trade. In general, the politics of the states and their weak bureaucracies
were directed toward self-representation, as well as the coverage of their own –
above all military – expenditure, and finally the allocation of honorary positions.
There was neither an economic policy nor economic theory.
Finley’s model of a ‘primitive’ non-dynamic economy has been more frequently
criticized than praised. However, his insistence on approaching the ancient world
conceptually, rather than arguing with selected quantities of evidence and common
sense, has transformed research in ancient history beyond the ancient economy.
And while many archaeologists, numismatists, and ancient historians have called
into question the largely literary foundation to Finley’s claims, with all the implica-
tions of social and geographical biases and stylization therein, no economic histori-
an of the ancient world nowadays can go back to the descriptive positivism of much
of pre-Finleyan economic history writing.
II. Back to Economic Growth: The Work of Keith Hopkins
and Beyond
As early as 1978, Keith Hopkins wrote an essay on the question of economic growth
in antiquity.70 In 1980 he published another influential article that developed a new
methodological approach for studying the ancient economy, a new model for the
 Hopkins 1978; cf. 1983.
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study of economic growth, and a model for the political economy of the Roman
Empire.71 But he did not return to the modernist alternative. Hopkins proposed that
in the long period from the first millennium  until the end of the second century
, there had been economic growth in the Graeco-Roman region, which accelerated
in the Roman Empire from the second century  onward. This growth had several
reasons: (1) an increase of agricultural production as a result of the increase of the
area under cultivation; (2) population growth and an increase in population density;
(3) an increase in the proportion of the population that was not active in the agricul-
tural sector; (4) an increase in the production volume per capita; (5) an increase in
production for tax purposes; and (6) a redistribution of taxes from more productive
to less productive areas of the Roman Empire and to the Roman frontiers. Methodo-
logically, Hopkins broke new ground by trying to provide quantitative evidence –
volumes of coinage and shipwrecks – for his theses. His taxes-and-trade model also
suggested new ways of thinking about the relationship between the city of Rome,
its provinces and the armies stationed to secure the Roman frontiers.72
Hopkins’s hypotheses still form the starting point of many archaeological and
historical research projects on the ancient economy. At first, however, his quantify-
ing methodology, still in its infancy, was criticized from several angles. From a nu-
mismatic point of view, it was questioned whether the evidence from coin hoards
could be extrapolated to quantify coin volumes in circulation and degrees of mone-
tization.73 Shipwreck evidence, because of recovery rates and the constraints of mar-
itime archaeology, also does not lend itself easily to long-term analyses of the rise
and decline of seaborne trade.74 A large number of studies, moreover, took issue
with Hopkins’s circulation and integration model (thesis 6).75 This was based on the
assumption that taxes in the Roman Empire were levied primarily in money, which
was rightly called into question. Other forms of monetary and nonmonetary taxes
and tributes were raised, forming a substantial part of the empire’s income. The
question of the extent to which the Roman Empire formed an economically integrat-
ed zone during the Roman Empire is still controversial. Adherents to the integration
model of the Roman market economy include Temin and Geraghty. But despite their
attempts, data are not sufficiently robust to prove an integrated market economy
that was based primarily on the laws of supply and demand.76
The publication of the Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World
marked a turning point in research on the ancient economy. Not only did it orga-
nize the current state of knowledge into a comprehensive multiauthored set of re-
 Hopkins 1980.
 Hopkins (1995‒1996) 2001 discussed this relationship with a new emphasis on the city of Rome
as a consumption center driving trade and economic performance (see also above, n. 36).
 E.g., Duncan-Jones 1989; Howgego 1992.
 Kitchen 2001.
 E.g., Jongman 1988; Howgego 1994; Woolf 1992.
 Rathbone and von Reden 2015.
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gional and chronological surveys, but it also set a new common agenda for the
study of the ancient economy. Based on the neo-institutional approach to economic
history developed by Douglass North, the editors defined the task of economic his-
tory as to explain economic performance through time. While being cautious not
to overemphasize economic growth in terms of per capita increase in productivity,77
they suggested that the population of the Mediterranean perhaps doubled between
ca. 800  and 200  and that there was a measurable increase in per capita
consumption over the long-term.78 Emphasizing explanation and quantification
rather than description and evaluation, they proposed a social science approach to
economic history in contrast to the traditional humanistic methodology that char-
acterized most ancient history writing. Already in 2005, Morris and Manning had
developed a methodological catalog for such an approach. They suggested, (1) to
make definitions of key terms and underlying assumptions clearer; (2) to be more
explicit about processes and model building; (3) to present clear propositions and
testable implications; (4) to be explicit about methods and standards of falsifica-
tion; (5) to break large problems down to smaller, more answerable questions; (6)
to specify causal relationships; (7) to quantify wherever possible; and (8) to formu-
late descriptions and explanations in ways that can be generalized to allow com-
parisons between different regions and periods.79
Neo-institutional economics, moreover, offered a number of conceptual tools
and models with which economic performance could be explained. Central among
these are institutional change, in particular the structure of property rights, the na-
ture of transaction costs, the role of the state as well as the development of knowl-
edge, including technological change, communication, and transport costs. Not all
authors of the CEHGRW followed the call, and not all sets of ancient evidence easily
lend themselves to answering the questions that neo-institutional economic poses,
but the approach, and the volume of knowledge that the CEHGRW assembled,
marked a starting point for increasingly scientific, quantitative, and comparative
research in ancient economic history. As a result, economic historians have made
greater use of the ever-increasing body of documentary evidence (papyri, coins, and
inscriptions), and of new quantifiable data generated by archaeological research.
Parallel to, but not in tandem with, the development of the social science orien-
tation of ancient economic history, archaeological science underwent fundamental
changes. Since the 1960s, anthropological archaeologists under the umbrella term
of New or Processual Archaeology had explored new theoretical and empirical
 Per capita increase of productivity, according to classical economic theory, is the only basis for
economic growth in real terms, while aggregate increase of wealth may be the result just of more
efficient mobilization or concentration of wealth. If approached from classical economic theory, the
only growth that matters is per capita increase of productivity; see Saller 2001 for discussion.
 Morris, Saller, and Scheidel 2007, 6–11.
 Morris and Manning 2005, 35. See now Canevaro, Erskine, Gray, and Ober 2018.
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methods in order to gain a more rigorous understanding of settlement structures,
cultivation methods, subsistence strategies, energy provision, consumption pat-
terns, trading behavior, forms of long-distance interaction and exchange, migration,
and their ecological and environmental condition.80 Prehistoric archaeology, that is,
archaeology in regions where written evidence is scarce or absent, has opened up
new areas and landscapes for economic research. Maritime archaeology, archaeo-
botanical research, skeletal analyses, and paleoclimatology offer new opportunities
for assessing more precisely the directions and scales of trade, standards of living,
the productivity of human landscapes, maritime technologies, and the economic
consequences of climate change. The volumes of the OxRep as well as their website
have assembled bodies of quantitative evidence and tested new methods of analyz-
ing large corpora of archaeological and documentary data. The intent of this work
is to gain a more differentiated understanding of regional diversity and the condi-
tions of economic performance related to agriculture, settlement, urbanization, and
trade.81
Globalization has changed how academics think. As Manning and Morris wrote
in 2005, “Finley’s was an ancient Mediterranean of divisions, rigid structures, and
powerful institutions; Horden’s and Purcell’s is one of mobility, connectivity, and
decentring.”82 20 years further on, the laboratory in which Greek and Roman histori-
ans analyze mobility, connectivity, and decentering has become bigger.
II. The Ancient Economy Turning Global
For a variety of academic and contemporary reasons, there has been an increasing
interest in global comparison, global trade, and global networking processes.83
Some Bronze Age archaeologists argue that the Afro-Eurasian region, or some zones
within it, formed a world system as early as the third millennium ,84 that is, that
they formed a space in which places interacted sufficiently to shape each other’s
economic and cultural development.85 Historians of later periods, including Imma-
nuel Wallerstein himself, were rather more hesitant to identify world systems in the
ancient world.86 Yet the concepts of world systems theory have profoundly influ-
enced postcolonial, globalization, and empire studies.87 The discussion in ancient
 Binford 1962; Clarke 1968; Renfrew and Bahn 1991; Wells 1992.
 Bowman and Wilson 2009; 2011; 2013; 2018; Weaverdyck, ch. 8.A, this volume.
 Morris and Manning 2005, 21–22.
 With a particular focus on an economic issue, Monson and Scheidel 2015.
 Sherrat and Sherrat 1993; Woolf 1990; Morley 2007b. For a stimulating summary of the original
model, see Wallerstein 2004.
 Kardulias and Hall 2008, 274‒275; cf. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Kuzmina and Mair 2008.
 Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997, 41–75; Woolf 1990; cf. Wallerstein 1974, 15–16.
 Morley 2007b; el-Ojeili 2014; Pitts and Versluys 2015.
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history about world systems stimulated debate over the significance of imperial pe-
ripheries and their role in transimperial exchange. The pioneering study by Philipp
Curtin already focused on what he called trade diasporas in border zones: tightly
organized merchant communities of the same cultural origin that provided protec-
tion and security for those engaging in commercial activities with the host commu-
nity.88 More recently, scholars have described how host communities in border
zones (both ecological and imperial) select or reject outside groups on the basis of
their own needs or benefits.89 Research on frontier zone and borderland processes
between ecologically different communities have qualified the picture of external
trade as an unproblematic in- and outflow of goods between empires.90
Frontier zones as regions of economic development and cross-border contact
have been studied mostly in connection with the Roman army. The military securing
of frontiers shifted large numbers of soldiers to the borders of the Roman world.91
The question of the supply of these armies with food, equipment and other daily
requirements has led to intensive research on the impact of the presence of the
Roman legions as a local economic factor of frontier zones. Were soldiers supplied
through requisition, local trade, trade over long distance, or the development of
agrarian land in the frontier region? In what ways did the presence of soldiers and
their demands encourage cross-border exchange either in the form of trade or diplo-
matic exchange of gifts? Answers vary, depending on the nature of the frontier, the
nature of the supplies, and the evidence available.92 Frontier zones in Britain, North
Africa, along the Danube, and the Eastern Desert have been researched intensely.
The amount of economic and infrastructural development in North Africa and Egypt
are particularly well studied, but they were of a very different kind, undertaken for
different reasons, and with different effects. In North Africa, the evidence for agrari-
an development, the development of the olive industry and the export of olives had
massive effects on markets throughout the Roman Empire. In the case of the Egyp-
tian Eastern Desert, the development of roads, praesidiae (forts), and wells in con-
nection with the exploitation of stone from Mons Claudianus and Porphyrites much
facilitated the transport of luxury goods from the Red Sea harbors, Arabia, and In-
dia.93 The questions of how and in what ways these infrastructures affected markets
and consumption within and outside the Roman Empire – or in Bowman and Wil-
son’s terms, in what ways they were part of a trade system – are only beginning to
be asked.
 Curtin 1984, 1–3.
 Morris 1999; Kardulias 2007; Kardulias and Hall 2008; Shaw 1990 and Purcell 2017.
 Ray 2003; Thomas 2012.
 See Weaverdyck, ch. 7 this volume, and Speidel below.
 Cherry 2007, 726–733.
 Cobb 2019; Schneider 2019.
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III Historiographic Trends in Roman Frontier Studies
III. Introduction
Rome’s borders, and the eminent importance the Romans assigned to them are as
old as the city itself. Tradition maintained that Rome’s founder, King Romulus, per-
sonally ploughed the original line of the city’s religious boundary, the pomerium,
and built a wall around the earliest settlement. Both Rome’s boundary and its pro-
tection were therefore considered to be essential to the very existence of the city
from its earliest days onward. This is also borne out by the introduction of the new
god Terminus, soon identified as an aspect of Rome’s supreme god Jupiter, during
the reign of Romulus (or that of his successor king Numa), as this god protected
boundary markers and guaranteed peace.
The Roman Republic that was established after the last king was overthrown
continuously expanded the often seemingly ill-defined boundaries of Roman power
and influence, moving them ever further away from the city which thereby turned
into an imperial capital. By the reign of Augustus (30 –14 ), Virgil, the poet of
Rome’s national epos, purported the empire to be one “without borders.”94 By the
end of Augustus’s reign, Roman expansion came to a near halt and the newly estab-
lished standing army was moved to the Rhine, the Danube, and to the Euphrates,
as well as to strategic positions in the Near East, Egypt, and North Africa. Before a
century was over, durable fortresses and defenses were erected and proclaimed to
protect the empire. With comparatively minor adjustments, but with the addition of
Britain under Claudius in 43  and Dacia under Trajan in 106, these remained
operational until around the early years of the fifth century  when foreign inva-
sions, civil wars, and weakened defenses wrenched control of the former frontiers
from the central government and set the scene for the collapse of the Western
Empire.
Boundaries, frontiers and defense systems thus played a very visible and impor-
tant role throughout Roman history. In order to understand the directions of modern
historiographic trends, it is essential to realize that the surviving ancient narratives
and other written sources have deeply influenced the ways in which modern histori-
ans thought about Rome’s borders and frontiers. Thus, ancient historiography only
rarely focuses on the history of frontiers and frontier zones as a subject in its own
right. On the few occasions when frontiers are mentioned, it is almost exclusively
in the context of military conflicts with Rome’s external neighbors. Unless these
‘barbarians’ beyond the frontiers were allied with the empire, ancient historiogra-
phy tended to portray them as hostile and bellicose, some to the point that “they do
 Virgil, Aeneid (Virg. Aen.) 1. 279; Harris 2016.
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not even understand what peace is.”95 In modern historiography, frontiers therefore
became a subject of military history. During the Republican period, however, in
which Rome expanded primarily at the expense of communities in Italy and Greece,
Carthage in North Africa, Spain, and the Hellenistic kingdoms in the East, outer
borders hardly ever surface in the ancient texts and are thus missing in modern
accounts. Perhaps the reason for their near absence in historical texts was that
Rome, rather than setting new external borders, usually took over those of the pow-
ers it subjugated. Exceptional mentions of boundaries are few, though one might
note the so-called Ebro treaty of ca. 226 , according to which the river Iber was
identified as the border between the sphere of influence of Carthage and Rome on
the Iberian Peninsula. The Carthaginian breach of this treaty is said to have caused
the Second Punic War (218–201 ).
III. Changing Perspectives
Evidently, this episode and its sources have been thoroughly studied by modern
historians. Yet only the more-or-less static frontiers of imperial Rome suggested
themselves forcefully to modern scholars as a complex subject worthy of intensive
scholarly attention in a time when the rising European colonial powers began to
view their own ‘civilizing mission’ as one that followed in Roman footsteps. When
the focus of scholarly interest first fell on imperial frontiers, they began to be stud-
ied within the broad narrative frame of an epic clash of cultures in which one (the
Greeks and Romans) was eminently superior and had the divine mission to push
back the other, inferior culture (the ‘barbarians’ beyond the frontiers) or at least to
keep it at bay. The significance of the empire’s frontiers was thus seen to lay in their
function as a dividing line between what was understood to be the civilized world
on the one side and a world on the other in which civilization was absent. Such
views were of course deeply rooted in the transmitted narratives from the ancient
world, in which humanitas (‘civilization’) was a wholly Roman concept and con-
trasted sharply with the strange, ferocious and irrational ways of the ‘barbarians.’96
Yet, within the empire, humanitas could be acquired through a process of assimila-
tion. Hence, modern historiography believed that those peoples, communities, and
landscapes absorbed and subjugated to Roman control eventually transformed as a
whole. They adopted Roman ways of life, architecture, and culture, learned Latin
and thus elevated to a higher degree of civilization, in a process Theodor Mommsen
referred to by the term “romanization”.97
 Tanta barbaria est ut nec intellegant pacem, Florus (Flor.) 2. 29, in the early second century 
on the Sarmatians.
 Woolf 1998, 54–67.
 Mommsen 1885, ch. 2.
714 Sitta von Reden and Michael Speidel
At any rate, it is perhaps hardly a coincidence that the interpretation of the
empire’s northern frontier in Britain that the eminent English historian Edward Gib-
bon (1737–1794) advanced set the tone for much of the ensuing discourse:
This wall of Antoninus, at a small distance beyond the modern cities of Edinburgh and Glas-
gow, was fixed as the limit of the Roman province. The native Caledonians preserved in the
northern extremity of the island their wild independence, for which they were not less indebt-
ed to their poverty than to their valour. Their incursions were frequently repelled and chas-
tised; but their country was never subdued … The masters of the fairest and most wealthy
climates of the globe turned with contempt from the gloomy hills assailed by winter tempests,
from lakes concealed in a blue mist, and from cold and lonely heaths over which the forest
deer were chased by naked barbarians.98
Independence was the only positive aspect of their existence, but even that was
owed to their own ignorance, brutality and greed as well as to the unwillingness of
the civilized to welcome the wild and naked into their world. Rome’s downfall was
understood as a consequence of its failure to ultimately keep the ‘barbarians’ out.
Cold, poverty and a life of danger and fatigue fortify the strength and courage of barbarians.
In every age they have oppressed the polite and peaceful nations … who neglected, and still
neglect, to counterbalance these natural powers by the resources of military art … The splendid
days of Augustus and Trajan were eclipsed by a cloud of ignorance, and the barbarians sub-
verted the laws and palaces of Rome.99
According to the traditional view, imperial Rome established its external borders
from the very beginning with the intention to defend the empire and to keep the
‘barbarians’ out.100 The significance of its frontiers was seen to have shifted over
the centuries from open, moving zones of an expanding empire to closed, static
lines of defense. The physical barriers, natural or erected, that surrounded the pro-
vincial territory came to be understood as military, moral, ideological and cultural
barriers separating civilization and law from barbarism and lawlessness.101 This
largely remained to be the case even after the discovery of a gate through Hadrian’s
Wall already in 1848 gave rise to criticism of the wall’s supposed impermeability.102
To some, however, the existence of a gate suggested that “the people north of it [the
Wall] were not very formidable” after all.103 To most, however, Rome’s boundaries
continued to be above all a geopolitical subject, a major part of the empire’s military
infrastructure, and one that needed to be studied within the framework of Roman
army studies. The end of the frontiers, and indeed the fall of the Western Empire in
 Gibbon 1776, 1.
 Gibbon 1781, 637 and 640.
 Rice Holmes 1928–1931, 2:164–165; Syme 1934, 352–354; Wells 1972, 152.
 Alföldi 1952; Miller and Savage 1977.
 Breeze 2018a, 166.
 Anonymus 1898, 49.
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476 , naturally found their explanations within this narrative frame. Allegoric
floods and dykes (thus natural disasters against man-made protections) determined
the narratives of these developments. The recruitment of increasing numbers of for-
eign, even ‘barbarian’ soldiers and mercenaries into the Roman army, an ensuing
decline of military discipline, and neglect to defend the borders were the main rea-
sons believed to have led to the fall of the Western Empire in 476.104 Such views
shaped and sometimes dominated the debate about Roman frontiers until the later
twentieth century and are still regularly discussed in attempts to describe the cur-
rent state of Roman frontier studies.105
Such were the insights most nonspecialists took away, and often still do, from
the published literature on Roman frontiers or from their own studies of the written
sources and archaeological remains. Thus, for instance, Lord Curzon of Kedleston,
Britain’s viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, who was praised for his attempts to
bring stability to the Indian frontier, was inspired by the history of Rome’s frontiers,
even though he later erroneously claimed that scholars had “almost wholly ig-
nored” the subject.106 According to him, the Roman Empire was “nowhere so like
our own as in its Frontier policy and experience.” In his view, India’s northwest
frontier could therefore compare “point by point with its ancient counterpart and
prototype, the frontier system of Rome.” C. Collin Davies, the historian and author
of a classic study on British India’s north-west frontier even concluded: “Rome fell
because her dykes were not strong enough to hold back the flood of barbarian in-
roads.”107 Rudyard Kipling’s descriptions of Hadrian’s Wall in Puck of Pook’s Hill
(1904) and of its meaning for the Roman Empire were inspired by the same images,
and the British experience of empire.
The study of Rome’s desert frontiers, too, was influenced by nineteenth-century
European imperial history and colonial experience. Thus, Lord Curzon explained
the absence of linear frontier barriers and legionary and auxiliary fortresses strung
out on from the edges of the deserts in North Africa and the Near East by referring
to Napoleon I, who judged that the desert was sufficient barrier and the most effec-
tive kind of frontier.108 The French in North Africa, believing in their ‘mission civili-
satrice,’ saw themselves as heirs to the Romans.109 With respect to the North African
frontier zones, their focus was set on the relations and interactions between the
nomadic and the sedentary populations. Hence, interpretations of the Roman barri-
ers in North Africa, the so-called Fossatum Africae, almost invariably “relate to ob-
servations of French colonial officials on transhumance in the land between the
 Von Domaszewski 1914, 256; 19672, 88.
 E.g., James 2005; Hingley 2017; Breeze 2018a and b.
 Curzon 1907, 4–5; ibid. 8 and 54 for the following quotations; cf. Whittaker 2004.
 Davies 1932, 2.
 Curzon 1907, 15–16; cf. Birley 2002a, 2.
 Baradez 1949, 362.
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desert and the cultivated areas, either supporting or challenging their interpreta-
tions.”110
Yet, even within Europe, interpretations of imperial Rome’s frontiers were any-
thing but irrelevant as they could take on hotly debated political dimensions. This
is perhaps most evident in the centuries-long dispute about the meaning of the
Roman Rhine frontier for French or Roman rule over the Alsace.111 Famously, this
dispute was fueled by the discovery, in the sixteenth century, of Tacitus’s Germa-
nia, which provided a Latin text of great authority to counterbalance Julius Cae-
sar’s claim that the Rhine marked the borders of Gaul. When France’s defeat in the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 led to its loss of Alsace and Lorraine, two eminent
ancient historians of their respective countries, Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges
and Theodor Mommsen, publicly exchanged arguments, based in part on their
knowledge of the ancient sources, for and against the Rhine as the border between
France and Germany.
From a structural perspective, however, the academic study of the Roman fron-
tiers developed as a branch of Roman archaeology with a strong input by ancient
history, and was initiated in the nineteenth century in Britain and Germany. The
beginnings of research on imperial frontiers in Britain (mainly of course Hadrian’s
Wall), is closely tied to the name of John Collingwood Bruce, a Newcastle clergyman
who produced a long series of publications about Hadrian’s Wall and who initiated
the tradition of an organized walk along the Wall, the so-called Pilgrimage that
began in 1849 and has continued every 10 years since 1886 except for the war
years.112 Scientific studies of the Wall were carried out and published by the local
English and Scottish archaeological societies. In Germany, after half a century of
debate, the centralized state-run Reichslimeskommission (RLK) was established in
1892 under the leadership of the newly united country’s leading ancient historian
Theodor Mommsen. The Kommission was funded and supported by the new German
imperial government in order to work out the route and document the remains of
the Roman frontier, its defenses as well as its associated forts and military installa-
tions north of the Alps on the territory of the Kaiserreich. Kaiser Wilhelm II publicly
expressed his support of this enterprise by extending his patronage for the re-
construction of the Roman fortress at the Saalburg. Between 1894 and 1937 the
RLK, which in 1902 passed under the directorship of Ernst Fabricius, professor of
ancient history in Freiburg, published the results of its work in 56 installments of
its publication series Der obergermanisch-rätische Limes des Römerreichs. This major
achievement had its clear impact on future studies of the Roman frontiers as it ap-
pears to have encouraged a reducing of the subject to linear barriers and strings of
heavily garrisoned forts.
 Wells 1991, 478; Breeze 2018a, 165.
 Whittaker 2004, 187–189.
 Birley 2002a, 1.
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The two world wars not only interrupted many archaeological and historical
projects and studies as well as ties between colleagues of different nations, they
also had various other impacts on the ways scholars began to interpret Roman fron-
tiers.113 Trench warfare in particular appears to have inspired interpretations of Ro-
man warfare and defense lines after the First World War.114 On the whole, however,
the Roman army’s role as a fighting force was marginalized after the Second World
War as a field of scholarly research, above all in German speaking academia. The
appalling war experiences many archaeologists and historians of the Roman fron-
tiers had personally suffered or witnessed, as well as the emergence of the Iron
Curtain, now began to influence Roman frontier studies.115 Thus, the study of all
forms and aspects of violence including the study of battles, military equipment
and techniques were considered repugnant and distasteful.116 Instead, questions
pertaining to the structures and organization of the army and to the military organi-
zation of the frontiers now took center stage.117
Since 1949, Roman frontier studies have developed largely (though not exclu-
sively) through the medium of the (usually) triennial international Roman Frontier
Studies Congress or Limes Congress, which convenes at changing locations with ac-
cess to archaeological sites on the Roman frontiers. Initiated by Eric Birley from
Durham University, the later Life President of the Congress, with the intention to
promote the exchange of British and foreign scholars working on Roman frontiers,
the Limes Congress has become one of the oldest periodic conventions in the studies
of the ancient world. Initially, the dominant tradition displayed through these Con-
gresses was to uncover (by excavation and survey), to record, and to reconstruct
the physical remains of infrastructure of the Roman army in the frontier regions of
the empire. Organizational questions regarding the Roman army, imperial wars and
military infrastructure, chronologies, archaeological typologies, and general aug-
mention of our databases of archaeological and historical information on such mat-
ters were the prime objectives of the presentations at the Limes Congresses.118 Soon,
however, the global political situation of the time began to show its impact on the
way in which scholars thought about Roman imperial frontiers. Cold War logic, in
any event, was in full accord with the main statement of an influential paper pre-
sented by Eric Birley in 1955 on Hadrianic frontier policy at the second Congress in
Carnuntum, Austria in which the author argued that it was an intention of Roman
frontiers to protect the empire’s inhabitants from foreign attacks and of the Roman
 Whittaker 2004, 186.
 Breeze 2018a.
 Alföldi 1952.
 James 2002, 12–14.
 James 2002, 13–14, 21; Breeze 2018a, 166.
 Birley 2002a.
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army to provide the safety that was necessary for the economic exploitation of the
lands.119
Also much-inspired by Cold War thinking was Edward N. Luttwak’s The Grand
Strategy of the Roman Empire from 1976. The author, a modern US strategist and
outsider to studies of the ancient world, was the first to offer a coherent narrative
of the Roman Empire’s military strategy along its frontiers based on the available
archaeological and historical sources (mainly fortification placement and transmit-
ted military operations). His reconstructions of Roman Grand Strategy were heavily
inspired by assumptions relevant to Cold War scenarios and the defense of the West
against threats from the communist East rather than by concepts and structures
from the Roman world, and have therefore been widely rejected by historians of the
Roman Empire.120 Luttwak’s book was nevertheless highly influential as the rejec-
tion of its conclusions sparked not only a lively (often heated) debate among those
engaged in Roman frontier studies about the empire’s frontier strategy.121 But it also
raised new questions of how to define this field of study.122 It substantially increased
efforts to understand the history of the imperial frontiers and the role of the army
in order to include new and different aspects to the hitherto predominant (though
never entirely exclusive) studies of the frontiers as military defenses of the empire
against external threats along physical barriers. In particular, the cultural and eco-
nomic impact of the army’s presence, the daily life of its soldiers, and the various
ways in which they were a burden on the population of the frontier zones became
an increasingly popular research subject.123
In the wake of these developments, a group of initially mainly British ancient
historians and archaeologists began to voice criticism of the traditions of the Limes
Congresses, calling for a move away from the study of Roman fortifications and
military strategies against external threats, as well as from the constraints imposed
by the traditional set of written sources, and for the development of a broader con-
cept of Roman frontiers that gives priority to wider social and economic aspects.124
The traditional approach toward Roman frontier studies as represented by the Limes
Congress was accused of being “unduly narrowly focused and obsessively con-
cerned with pointless minutiae,” “introverted,” “far too parochial for its own (or
anybody else’s) good,” “predominantly conservative,” and “permanently suspicious
of innovation, especially in theory,” while being mostly preoccupied with the wrong
kind of questions.125 The effects of Rome’s frontiers on the local populations and
 Birley 1956.
 Mann 1979; Millar 1982; Isaac 1990; Whittaker 1994, 62–66.
 Wheeler 1993; Breeze 2011; Breeze 2018b.
 Isaac 1990.
 E.g., Bowman 1994; Birley 2002b; Erdkamp 2002.
 Isaac 1990; Whittaker 1994; Elton 1996; Mattingly 1997; James 2005; Gardner 2013; Gardner
2017.
 James 2005, 499, 501–502; Breeze 2018b, 2.
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the threat by external forces were considered far less significant than previously
thought.126 The processes and results of ‘romanization’ were reinvestigated and
found to be far more complex and diverse than many had previously held.127 Even
the view, accepted since Gibbon, that the pax Romana meant general peace and
prosperity within the empire was challenged with reference to attested domestic
and juridical violence.128 Although much of the critique and call for innovation was
no doubt justified and resulted in fruitful debates and inspiring new contributions,
they were not always free of exaggerations and omissions of existing alternative
views, particularly in other national traditions and their publications.
Since the 1980s and 1990s, increased attention has thus been directed toward
the complexities of the interactions between native peoples under Roman domina-
tion and the representatives of the empire. As a result, it became increasingly com-
mon to study frontiers not so much as fortified linear military barriers but as zones
of a specific nature in which cultural, social, and economic aspects played a promi-
nent role.129 Theory and models came to be favored,130 which unsurprisingly also
encouraged cross-cultural and cross-temporal comparative studies,131 as well as
studies investigating interpretations of the Roman army with regard to contempo-
rary theories of migration and globalization.132 It is now generally accepted that
Roman frontiers cannot be understood in isolation from socioeconomic and cultural
processes along, far behind, and far beyond the frontiers themselves.133 It has also
been suggested that the frontier zone along the edge of the empire was indeed an
important factor for the development and prosperity of the Roman state.134
III. Long-Distance Trade and the Frontiers
In addition to supplying the army, trade movement across the Roman frontier exist-
ed at all times. Mortimer Wheeler explored this important subject in his Rome be-
yond the Imperial Frontiers in 1954. It was recently again the subject of a collection
of articles.135 The long-distance overland and maritime trade routes through Egypt,
the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia had to cross Roman borders
 Isaac 1990; Elton 1996; Whittaker 2004, 45–46.
 Woolf 1998; 2014; Mattingly 2004; Versluys 2014.
 Woolf 1993.
 Isaac 1990; Whittaker 1994; Whittaker 2004; cf. James 2005; Hekster and Kaizer 2012; Hingley
2017.
 Birley 2002a, 7; Hingley 2017.
 Miller and Savage 1977; Breeze 2008; McWilliams 2011; cf. Hingley 2017, 2; Breeze 2018b, 3.
 Hingley 2017; Breeze 2018a, 165.
 Birley 2002a, 3; James 2005, 501.
 Whittaker 1994; Whittaker 2004; cf. Speidel 2016, esp. 165.
 Wells 2013.
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and frontier zones. Therefore, studies investigating trade between the Roman Em-
pire and South Arabia, East Africa or India usually engage with questions pertaining
to the Roman army and the empire’s frontiers.136 In particular, the army’s role in
safeguarding trade routes and traders as well as its involvement in the collection of
tolls and taxes have been repeatedly studied.137 Moreover, the mechanisms and ef-
fects of cross-border mobility on the Roman frontiers has received attention. Seen
to be largely a result of trade and military activity, these types of mobility central-
ized the Roman frontiers as spaces which aggregated and disseminated information
about various parts of the world, as far away as China.138 However, trade between
the Roman Empire and the East is only rarely investigated by the same scholars who
engage in Roman frontier studies or Roman army studies. Moreover, specialized and
distinct academic disciplines often deal with just one side of Rome’s former borders,
for example in the Arabian Peninsula, Nubia, or North Africa, and lack sufficient
knowledge of the sources, methods, institutions, and concepts of the other. Both of
these obstacles stand in the way of a comprehensive and universal study of the
frontier zones of the Roman Empire, which therefore remain under-researched in
many of the respective areas.
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